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BOOK REVIEWS: ACLU HANDBOOK SERIES
The American Civil Liberties Union has embarked on a
project to publish a series of handbooks which describe and explain the civil and legal rights of selected groups. In an effort
to acquaint readers of the Santa ClaraLawyer with this series, we
have obtained reviews of some of the more recently published
handbooks.
Other handbooks which are now available outline the rights
of servicemen, teachers, reporters, and the poor. The remaining
handbooks projected for publication concern the rights of hospital
patients, old people, ex-servicemen, aliens, homosexuals, government employees, candidates, young people, lawyers, union members, and the mentally retarded. For further information about
the handbook series, our readers are urged to contact the
American Civil Liberties Union, 22 East 40th Street, New York,
New York 10016.

THE RIGHTS OF SUSPECTS. By Oliver Rosengart. An American Civil Liberties Union Handbook. New York: Avon Books.
1974. Pp. 124. Softbound. $.95. New York: E.P. Dutton &
Co., Inc. 1973. Pp. 122. Cloth. $5.95.
Oliver Rosengart's handbook on the rights of suspects is one
of a series of books, now in publication or preparation by the
American Civil Liberties Union, which are intended to acquaint
American citizens with their basic civil and legal rights. The need
for such an undertaking is obvious and the attempt commendable.
It is therefore with some reluctance that I conclude Mr. Rosengart's book fails to achieve the ACLU's objectives. Indeed, in
some respects, its value is questionable, for it may do the unwary
reader more harm than good.
The faults of the book can be classified into four categories.
First, some areas of discussion are poorly organized. Second, and
more important, it contains a number of serious misstatements of
law. Third, its statements of the law are applicable only to a
limited number of American jurisdictions and thus do not present
a comprehensive legal overview of the topics it covers. Fourth,
the infusion of Mr. Rosengart's very strong, albeit sincere, political
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beliefs has biased what should arguably have been an objective
statement of legal rights, thereby resulting in a somewhat onesided and unrealistic statement of suspects' rights. The effect of
any one of these shortcomings would be to detract from the merits
of the book; the combined effect of all four is seriously to impair
its usefulness.
1. Poor organization. The author has divided his subject
matter into four parts: Rights in Individual Confrontations with
the Police, Rights Upon Arrest, Rights in Court, and Remedies.
One problem created by this division is immediately evident: how
does the lay reader realistically distinguish between "a confrontation with the police" and an "arrest," particularly if he or she is
not cognizant of the arcane legal distinctions between temporary
detention and actual arrest?
This is not a minor cavil. A citizen's possible involvement
with the crinnal process as a criminal suspect is not limited solely
to individual confrontations with the police. For example, the
fourth amendment, which protects persons from unreasonable
searches and seizures, has also been construed to extend protection to an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.' Fourth
amendment protections have also extended to the sanctity of the
suspect's home and to protect personal effects against illegal search
or seizure. These restrictions are not limited only to police
searches, but extended also to actions taken by private citizens
when acting as unofficial agents of the police. 2 It appears that
the author's attempt to explain these fourth amendment protections in the context of various individual police confrontations
could better have been accomplished under a separate chapter
heading which would have clearly explained the basic aspects of
the suspect's protections against illegal search and seizure.
Specific examples of police confrontations could have been
provided to clarify and illustrate the explanatory material.
Mr. Rosengart's organizational method (and lack of an
index) prevent a reader who is unfamiliar with the terminology
of the criminal process from finding the information he seeks.
For example, every criminal lawyer knows that a search of a home,
pursuant to a warrant, may be performed in the owner's absence.'
Yet an unsophisticated reader whose home had been searched
while he was away might not expect the book's coverage of his
situation to be located in the chapter which is ostensibly devoted
to individual encounters with the police.
1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
2. See People v. Haydel, 12 Cal. 3d 190, 524 P.2d 866, 115 Cal. Rptr. 394

(1974) (protecting against coerced confessions); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1968)
(providing protection against electronic surveillance).
3. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1531 (West 1970).

SANTA CLARA LAWYER

[Vol. 15

As another organizational matter, the question and answer
format used in The Rights of Suspects is an ineffective method
of presenting a comprehensive explanation of such important areas
as fourth and fifth amendment protections. While the question
and answer method may be an appropriate format for presenting
the more generalized areas of individual rights covered by the
ACLU series, it strikes this reviewer as not well suited to providing crucial informational assistance to the criminal suspect. Although most criminal suspects will promptly seek the advice of
knowledgable counsel, any who choose to rely on this book for
at least an initial primer of their rights should have a quick, concise
summary of these rights available, so that they will not be inadvertently waived, or so that incriminating statements as a result
of incomplete information will not be made. If the question and
answer format was necessary to maintain consistency within the
ACLU series, then additional treatment should have been provided in this volume through a concise chapter summary or an
appendix outlining such vital areas as the scope of the fourth and
fifth amendment protections, and the exclusionary rule.
These omissions are quite serious. As a criminal defense
attorney representing indigent defendants in court almost daily,
I can state with some assurance that it is quite difficult to explain
the concept of suppression to a client who is completely unfamiliar
with this legal term. For Rosengart to proceed directly into an
exposition of various fourth amendment situations without a preliminary explanation is to invite complete confusion from the lay
reader. Although it may be safe to assume that -the practicing
bar is familiar with the impact of Mapp v. Ohio,4 the same cannot
be said of the American public.
It would have been far better for Rosengart to have begun
each section of his book with a definition of the basic right involved (perhaps, for example, by dividing the fourth amendment
discussion into searches and arrests), to have explained very
clearly the ramifications of a violation of the right, and then to
have proceeded to specific examples. This would have helped
considerably to insure that the reader obtain a basic understanding
of his rights-which was, after all, the author's primary objective.
2. Misstatements of law. Several serious errors of law are
included in the text, at least one of which is unforgivably negligent.
(a) Illegally obtained confession as impeachment. Although Mr. Rosengart discusses 5 the admissibility of confessions
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. 0. ROSENGART, THE
as

ROSENOGAT].

RIGHTS OF SUSPECTS

99-100 (1973) [hereinafter cited
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and the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona,' he fails to warn
his readers that any confession obtained in violation of the
Miranda rule may nonetheless be admissible to impeach the sus-7
pect, should he attempt to vary his account at a subsequent trial.
This distinction is important, and the omission unfortunate, for as
my experience has taught, the most prevalent police abuse of a
suspect's rights is the failure to acknowledge his assertion of
Miranda rights. This abuse generally flows from the widely-held
belief by the police that an illegally obtained confession is better
than no confession at all. Moreover, fear of impeachment will
usually prevent the defendant from taking the stand, allowing the
de facto presumption of guilt attendant upon a defendant's failure
to explain himself to infect the jury, unless a countervailing
instruction is given by the judge.
(b) Auto searches. Mr. Rosengart gives what appears to
be an authoritative explanation of the circumstances under which
the police may search a vehicle.' Yet he does not mention that
the mere existence of probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband will provide sufficient justification for a searcha rule of law which was first established in 19251 and has been
considerably broadened by subsequent decisions.
(c) Vicarious exclusion. The author explains in his discussion of suppression hearings 1° that the defendant must testify that
he actually possessed the disputed evidence at the time of its
seizure in order to have standing to seek suppression. This is
definitely not the rule in California," nor perhaps in several other
states as well. While the failure to indicate exceptions to the
author's stated rule is not a serious shortcoming, it indicates a lack
of thoroughness which is not expected from a book of this sort,
nor particularly from the American Civil Liberties Union.
3. Lack of general applicability. Legal reasoning is generally reasoning by analogy. In every legal analysis, there is the
danger that the attempt to analogize a rule will be fatally infected
by peculiar or specialized facts from the specific case or cases from
which the analysis begins. Mr. Rosengart, a lawyer who obviously
has had a good deal of experience in handling narcotics cases in
New York City, nevertheless falls victim to this analytical hazard.
Although, he has written a book which will be of value to persons
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
ROSENGART, supra note 5, at 27-31.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
ROSENGART, supra note 5, at 95.
People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
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charged with narcotics offenses in New York City, it is considerably less valuable to anyone so charged in other jurisdictions. The
author has provided specialized advice for people whose homes
have been ransacked by the police, 1" who are ordered by a police
officer to turn out their pockets while in the possession of contraband,"8 or who are searched by police at borders or airports.'" He
also provides some specific references to specialized laws in other
states. The book, however, would have been of greater value had
it provided more general statements of these laws which would
have applied to all American jurisdictions. In this way all criminal
suspects could derive valuable advice from the book, after which
the author could provide his specialized data in these areas once
his conceptual foundation was firmly laid.
4. Political bias. When I undertook to write this review I
hardly expected I would have to defend police officers as a class,
but I find to my dismay that such a defense is required. One
of Mr. Rosengart's basic premises seems to be that a police officer
will use any means, whether fair or foul, and no matter how
degrading or unscrupulous, to convict the hapless suspect. The
contention is generally incorrect but often repeated in the book.
Thus the reader is first told that the police often lie to justify
an illegal search." He is then led to believe the police will refuse
to reveal public records which they are dutybound to disclose.' 6
Next, the author claims the Robinson-Gustafson 7 rule will be circumvented by police perjury as to the actual facts surrounding the
custodial arrest.' 8 The reader is informed the police make
completely arbitrary stops of minorities and youths, search them
thoroughly, then claim the resulting product of the search was
initially in "plain view."' 9 Finally, the reader is told that judges
sign search warrants without reading the supporting affidavits;2"
that the police circumvent Chimel v. California21 by perjuring
themselves as to the location of contraband, 22 that they deliberately fail to give Miranda warnings and then perjure themselves
by asserting the opposite on the witness stand;2 3 and that they
12. ROSENGART, supra note 5, at 37.
13. Id. at 25-26.
14. Id. at 38-41.
15. Id. at 23.

16. Id. at 27.
17. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida,
414 U.S. 260 (1973).
18. ROSENOART, supra note 5, at 29.
19. Id. at 31.
20. Id. at 33.
21.

395 U.S. 752 (1969).

22.

ROSENGART,

23. Id. at 55.

supra note 5, at 37.
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deliberately prejudice line-up identifications by appearing in them
as comparison "suspects" while wearing items of clothing which
easily distinguish them as police officers.2 4
Police perjury is an unfortunate fact of life in criminal practice, but it is far less common than Mr. Rosengart would have his
readers believe. The average police officer is a highly partisan
witness who has nevertheless become proficient at maintaining the
appearance of detached neutrality during a trial. The "convenient memory," a characteristic of most interested witnesses, is no
less common among police witnesses; but the insinuation that the
police are universally guilty of committing the sort of premeditated
perjury that the author describes is simply unfair and without
foundation.
My principal objection to the author's insinuations about
police practices is that they are out of place. The book would
be more effective if it were a more neutral description of a suspect's constitutional rights. Despite the existence of police
abuses, the author's generalized bias not only tends to color his
own perceptions, but also detracts from his more valid criticisms
of unfair police practices. Although police malfeasance certainly
affects the treatment a criminal suspect receives, the handbook
would have better served its purpose had it focused more closely
on the constitutional rights of suspects, relegating warnings against
possible police abuses to a more secondary role.
Conclusion
This book has a laudable purpose which has been only
partially fulfilled. The rights of criminal suspects are highly
precious-the consequences resulting from their abuse are not
simply employment discrimination, poor working conditions, ineligibility for welfare or even infringement of first amendment
freedoms, which are ably treated in other ACLU handbooks, but
imprisonment, a criminal record and a loss of important civil rights.
For this reason alone, The Rights of Suspects requires a more
comprehensive and accurate portrayal of these important legal
rights than the author has provided. The attempt is commendable, but the final result may prove harmful to anyone who
chooses to rely solely on the legal advice contained therein. I
would sincerely hope that the ACLU and Mr. Rosengart soon
publish a second edition of the book which will remedy these
shortcomings.
Frank Dudley Berry, Jr.*
24. Id. at 61.
* B.A., 1968, Pomona College; J.D., 1971, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall); Assistant Public Defender, Santa Clara County; member, California Bar.

SANTA CLARA LAWYER

[Vol. 15

THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN. By Susan C. Ross. An American
Civil Liberties Union Handbook. New York: Avon Books.
1973. Pp. 384. Softbound. $1.25. New York: E.P. Dutton
&Co., Inc. 1973. Pp. 384. Cloth. $7.95.
Susan C. Ross' The Rights of Women is exactly what it claims
to be, a basic and thorough guide to women's rights. It is written
primarily for the lay person who is interested in learning about
the legal protections available to women. I would have no hesitation, however, in strongly recommending this book for use as a
primer to any attorney who has not previously worked in the field
of women's rights.
Unlike most commentaries on women's rights, The Rights of
Women is a positive book. Instead of dwelling on the many injustices which women have suffered under the law, it addresses
the remedies which a woman should pursue when, solely because
of her sex, she is treated differently in her employment or schooling, or by the criminal justice system. In addition, the author's
explanation of the many legal and administrative procedures
through which violations of women's rights may be redressed will
afford the average reader the opportunity more fully to understand
the functioning of our legal system.
For example, there is an excellent discussion of how the state
action clause of the United States Constitution presently relates to
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and how
it may one day relate to the equal rights amendment. This discussion is characteristic of Ross' ability to express in simple terms
those basic legal principles which have been known to confuse
many attorneys as well as lay persons.
The section on employment illustrates the author's ability to
simplify and organize. Like the remainder of the book, this section is written in question and answer format:
Under what law is it illegal to discriminate against women
workers?
Five major Federal laws and a myriad of state laws forbid such discrimination. Federal laws are Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act (generally referred to as Title VII);
the Equal Pay Act; two Executive Orders issued by Presidents

Johnson and Nixon, Executive Order 11246 (as amended by
E.O. 11375) and Executive Order 11478; and the Age Discrimination Act of 1967.1

Ross discusses separately each of these federal laws. In her
treatment of Title VII, also through the question and answer for1. S. Ross, THE

RIGHTS OF WOMEN

39 (1973).
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mat, she deals with bona fide occupational qualifications, light
work versus heavy work, protective state labor laws, illegal sex
segregation, seniority and its effects in locking women into lower
paying jobs, sex-segregated want ads, employee testing, child care
responsibilities as they relate to employment, marriage, retirement
age, and job recruitment, training and promotion.
After discussing each of these topics, she examines the procedures for filing an Equal Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.)
complaint and for avoiding the two to three year delay normally
experienced in waiting for the E.E.O.C. to process complaints.
She advises anyone seeking relief under Title VII to retain an
attorney and request a "Right to Sue" letter from the E.E.O.C.,
which will then permit the recipient to by-pass the Commission's
administrative process and more rapidly prosecute her case in
court. The Commission will generally issue such a letter on
request. On receipt of the "Right to Sue" letter, the recipient
or her attorney is allowed ninety days in which to initiate litigation.
Statutes of limitation establishing the period within which a charge
must be filed with the E.E.O.C. are explained and potential
claimants are urged to file within the 180 or 300 day statute.
Those against whom the applicable statute has run, however, are
urged to file anyway and claim that the discrimination which they
have suffered is continuing. This is a wise suggestion, for most
discrimination occurs repeatedly and is not confined to a single
incident.
Title VII provides that a court may award attorney fees and
costs to the prevailing party.2 The author encourages women to
seek attorneys who will take their cases on a cost only basis and
later look to the court for an award of attorney's fees. Any
attorney who is filing his or her first cause of action under Title
VII would be well-advised to read carefully this procedural section. It is both concise and accurate, and may be an invaluable
guide for finding one's way through the Title VII procedural mire.
The Equal Pay Act and Executive Order 11246, 3 as
amended by Executive Order 11375,4 are discussed in some
detail. These Executive Orders compel compliance with existing
laws by requiring contractors and subcontractors of the federal
government to promise not to discriminate, and to take affirmative
action to remedy the effects of past discrimination as a condition
precedent to entering into government contracts.
In the event that a government contractor fails to comply with
these laws, Ross states that a woman can file a complaint with the
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
3. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974).

4. 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 (1967).
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Office of Federal Contract Compliance (O.F.C.C.), a division of
the Department of Labor, to seek enforcement of the Executive
Orders. She also describes the possible penalties for violation,
among which are the delay or cancellation of a particular contract,
or even a denial to the offending contractor of the opportunity to
obtain future contracts from the federal government. Ms. Ross
is critical of the O.F.C.C.'s failure to utilize these penalties, but
since she believes the same relief to be available under Title VII,
she discourages women from bringing lawsuits for enforcement
under the Executive Orders because of prior court failures to provide adequate relief.
Although many lawyers might not be interested in filing legal
actions pursuant to the Executive Orders, since the orders do not
provide for damages or attorney's fees, I strongly disagree with
Ms. Ross' reasons for discouraging such litigation. The Executive
Orders can provide a great deal of leverage against those
companies whose primary source of business is the federal government. Although the possibility of a class action under Title VII
is a risk which such companies are often willing to accept, the
threat of losing important government contracts for even a year
is not. Since publication of The Rights of Women, there have
been numerous cases in which courts have granted standing to
women under the Executive Orders. These cases have been
brought only because women and their lawyers have refused to
accept continued discrimination without a fight. The extension
to women of standing to sue under the Orders would not have
occurred had these same attorneys concentrated only on Title VII
actions, as Ms. Ross suggests. Hopefully, these court cases will
pressure the O.F.C.C. into beginning the job of enforcement for
which it was created.
From the area of employment, Ross moves on to consider
education, more specifically, the Education Amendments of
1972,1 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,6 the Public Service
Health Act,7 and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The above are discussed in conjunction with such
practical problems as courses required only for girls, school athletic
programs, pregnant students, campus living arrangements, distinctions vis a vis women's rights between private and public schools,
and admissions policies.
The section on crime and delinquency considers such important issues as sentencing, prison conditions, rape, prostitution and
other sex offenses. In addition to this informative discussion, Ms.
5. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235.
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17.
7. Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 92-52, 85 Stat. 144 (1971).
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Ross also explains how women can assist in making much needed
changes in these areas.
An important chapter of the The Rights of Women deals
primarily with the ways in which women can make the mass media
more responsive to their needs. The author specifically considers
the licensing authority and jurisdiction over the air waves vested
in the Federal Communications Commission, and she explains
how women can effectively challenge the licensing of a station
which is not acting in the public interest. The possibilities of
using the Fairness Doctrine as a tool to correct degrading stereotyping of women and to ensure media responsibility in the discussion of women's rights issues are also mentioned.
Of course, no women's guide would be complete without a
section on abortion, and The Rights of Women is not deficient
in this regard. The recent United States Supreme Court decisions
on abortion are considered and interpreted by the author. s Sterilization, birth control, and the special problems minors encounter in these areas are also addressed.
A fairly informative section on divorce is included which is
too elementary to be of much use to most attorneys, but which
provides women with helpful advice on such ordinary problems
as child custody and support, spousal support, and division of
property. It also includes a lengthy discussion about what to
expect from one's attorney in divorce matters and advice as to how
and when to terminate an unsatisfactory attorney-client relationship.
Any attorney who has not previously worked in the area of
sex discrimination might find the 100-page appendix to this
volume to be a useful research tool. The appendix charts the
state laws which forbid sex-based discrimination in employment
and housing. It also surveys the laws relating to financing in education and name changes. Finally, it lists and describes important
sources of legal help for those who feel they are in need of more
consultation or assistance than this book can provide.
The Rights of Women is a concise, readable, and highly useful publication. It is a welcome addition to the American Civil
Liberties Union handbook series and will provide helpful guidance
to women who seek to enforce their rights, as well as being of
service to anyone interested in becoming better informed about
the legal rights of women in our society.
BarbaraLawless Bourhis*
8. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).

* B.A., 1968 Marymount College; J.D., 1972, University of California,
Berkeley (Boalt Hall); London School of Economics, 1966-67; Director, Public
Interest Law Center, Los Gatos; member, California Bar.
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By Bruce Ennis and Loren
Siegel. An American Civil Liberties Handbook. New York:
AvonBooks. 1973. Pp.ix+ 336. Softbound. $1.25.
THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS.

The assertion that some involuntarily hospitalized mental patients suffer a loss of civil rights is unquestionably true. Such a loss
of freedom and autonomy can, and in many cases does, interfere
with treatment, adding ironic insult to the injury inflicted by the
denial of constitutional rights. It is equally true that freedom and
autonomy are mere illusions to many mental patients; if suddenly
given their freedom, their capacity to exercise rational control over
themselves and their environment would be limited. Absolutists,
who insist that either extreme is the prevailing condition for all
mental patients, do a disservice to the mentally ill. The arrogance of
some psychiatrists and psychologists at one extreme is matched by
the arrogance of some civil libertarian lawyers at the other.
Reluctantly, I find it necessary to begin this review of the
ACLU handbook, The Rights of Mental Patients, by Bruce Ennis
and Loren Siegal, with the foregoing paragraph. The book is strident and arrogant; it does not help mental patients to suggest, as the
authors do, that "every prospective patient should hire a lawyer, if
he can afford one, or ask the court to appoint a free lawyer, if he
cannot."' Although the authors make plain their suspicion and distrust of psychiatrists, 2 my own experience has indicated that most
psychiatrists and psychologists are interested in the well-being of
their patients and are sensitive to their civil rights. In most cases, I
have also found that involuntarily hospitalized patients do require
hospitalization.
In California, the common experience of many mentally ill
persons is not that they have been subjected to excessive hospitalization, but rather that they have suffered over the past several years
because of premature discharge from state hospitals.8 Inadequate
alternative care arrangements in their local communities has only
exacerbated the problem of incomplete mental health care.' In my
I.
2.

B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 12 (1973).
E.g., "mental illness" is an "unproven theory," id. at 11; "it is quite com-

mon for psychiatrists to hospitalize patients against their will," id. at 12; it is "distressingly common" for psychiatrists to coerce patients into voluntary commitment, id. at 36; it is "distressingly common" for doctors to change medications
before a hearing so that patients appear at their worst, id. at 294-95. No statistics
or cited studies support these assertions.
3. Final Report dated March 5, 1974, of California Senate Select Committee
on Proposed Phaseout of State Hospital Services, established by Senate Resolution No. 20, March 28, 1975.
4. Russ & Bettey, "The Chaotic State of the City's Board and Care Homes,"
The Bay Guardian 8:20, Aug., 1974.
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judgment, such patients are not necessarily better off with the
"freedom" given to them as a by-product of the efforts to dismantle
the state hospital systems.
Even with a more balanced statement of the problem, there
still remain those instances in which mentally ill patients are denied
their rights. Involuntary hospitalization, denial of access to telephones and contact with visitors, and custody without treatment
are examples. It is to these situations that The Rights of Mental
Patients is most usefully directed, despite its shrillness.
The textual portion of the book is short-only seventy-five
pages-but in that space there is a complete statement of the various situations in which the civil rights of mentally ill persons can be
violated and suggestions as to what can be done to redress the denial of these rights. The book also contains an appendix of 189 pages,
keyed to the textual discussion of the rights of the mentally ill, in
which the law of each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia
is summarized. Additional appendices include a chapter which discusses trial techniques, a bibliography of cases and authorities, and
a reprint of the opinion in Wyatt v. Stickney,5 which established the
right to treatment for involuntary patients.
The book is crisp, to the point and helpful in a situation where
a patient's civil rights have been violated. To an attorney confronting the legal issues of mental illness for the first time the book is
invaluable. The chapter on trial techniques is well constructed and
makes appropriate reference to the useful book by Jay Ziskin (who
is both a psychologist and lawyer), Coping with Psychiatric and
Psychological Testimony.6 Although not suggested by the authors,
their book would be exceptionally useful in educating mental
health professionals as to the constitutional rights of the mentally
ill.
As counsel for the California State Psychological Association, a member of the San Francisco Mental Health Advisory
Board, and a long-time member of the ACLU, I find myself subject
to divergent sympathies in reacting to this book. Mentally ill patients need the help of both mental health professionals sensitive to
civil rights and lawyers who are also trained to be aware of the nature of mental illness and the means of treating it. There is a need
for a method of delivering legal services and advocacy to the mentally ill which is independent of the system of medical treatment.7
5. 344 F. Supp. 387, supplemental order to 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.
1972), modifying 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
6.

J.

ZISKEN,

COPING WITH

PSYCIATRIC

AND

PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY

(1970).
7. Patch, The Mentally Disabled and His Lawyer, 2 J. PsYcmIATRY & L. 33
(1974).
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The lawyers who provide this legal assistance must be able to understand the varieties of human behavior under the stresses of mental disability without becoming distrustful of mental health professionals. At the same time, these lawyers must be on the watch for a
denial of their clients' civil rights and be willing to act vigorously in
the patients' interest. Despite the extreme rhetoric used in The
Rights of Mental Patients,the book can be a useful tool in effectuating such legal representation.
Irwin Leff*
* B.S., 1947, LL.B., 1951, Harvard University; member of the firm of Rosenthal & Leff, Inc.; member of Mental Health Advisory Board, San Francisco;
Secretary, San Francisco Mental Health Association.

THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS. By Alan Levine with Eve Carey
and Diane Divoky. An American Civil Liberties Union Handbook. New York: Avon Books. 1973. Pp. vi, 160. Softbound.
$.95.
Only a few years ago, a book entitled The Rights of Students
would have made a rather slim volume. Except in a handful of
cases dealing with matters such as exemptions from the mandatory
recitation of the pledge of allegiance' and similar issues related
to the separation of church and state,2 the concept of student rights
was virtually unrecognized by either school officials or the judiciary. Schools were generally accepted by both the public at large
and educational professionals as enclaves of totalitarianism. As
a result, students were routinely subjected to the sometimes
arbitrary whims of school administrators.
The past decade, however, has witnessed literally a flood of
litigation concerning the conditions imposed upon children and
adolescents in the schools of this nation; the result has been an
enormous broadening of the rights of students. Along with the
steady erosion of the traditional doctrine of in loco parentis-the
archaic notion that school authorities possess the same authority
over students as their parents-numerous petty and demeaning
restrictions placed upon students have been struck down by state
and federal courts throughout the country.' From the multiplicity
1. E.g., West Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
2. E.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
3. See, Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972) (right not to take
R.O.T.C. class); Holt v. Shelton, 341 F. Supp. 821 (M.D. Tenn. 1972) (right of
married high school girl to participate in extracurricular activities).
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of cases involving the imposition of rigid dress codes4 and hair
restrictions on students,5 to the even more insidious attempts of
school authorities to silence legitimate dissent and the exercise of
first amendment rights by young people, 6 courts repeatedly have
been called upon to intercede on behalf of students to curb such
arbitrary and capricious exercises of authority by school officials.
Although courts have affirmed the right of the school
authorities to impose restrictive conditions upon students in some
of these cases,7 the modem trend among the judiciary has been
to protect students against arbitrary and unnecessary infringement
of their activities. This progressive trend was given a tremendous
impetus by the 1969 landmark decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District.8 In that case the Court held that students "in school as
well as out of school are persons under our Constitution" and are
"possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect." 9
Although that view had been expressed by student advocates for
several years prior to the Tinker decision, the acknowledgement
by the highest court in the land that people do not lose their constitutional rights simply because of their status as students marked
the real beginning of the students' rights movement. The 1975
decision of the Supreme Court, in Goss v. Lopez,1 ° holding that
students may not be expelled or subjected to substantial interference with their right to receive an education without adherence
to procedural due process requirements, provides further protection for the constitutional rights of students against arbitrary action
by school officials. While numerous state and federal courts had
reached similar conclusions during the past five years, the Goss
decision dispelled any lingering doubts as to the application of constitutional principles to students and to the educational process
generally.
Within this context, the ACLUs The Rights of Students provides exactly what it promises: a basic guide to the public school
4. E.g., Bannister v. Paradis, 316 F. Supp. 185 (D.N.H. 1970).

5. E.g., Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw,
450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971).
6. E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (right

to wear black armbands); Riseman v.School Comm.of City of Quincy, 439 F.2d
148 (1st Cir. 1971) (right to distribute literature on school property); Burnside
v.Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) (right to wear buttons with printed slogans).
7. See, e.g., Guziok v.Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970) (no right to
wear buttons with printed slogans); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ.,
363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (same).

8. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
9. Id. at 511.
10. Goss v.Lopez, 95 S.Ct. 729 (1975).
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student's rights. It is written in a simple, easy to interpret question and answer style designed primarily to be used by the lay
person or student. Although its simplicity makes the handbook
less valuable as a research tool for the practicing attorney, it nevertheless provides a handy reference to facilitate a rapid understanding of some of the principles and cases in this developing area.
Like most of the ACLU books, it was not designed to serve as
a legal treatise on its subject matter, but rather as a elementary
guide to students, parents and educators, highlighting the law
peculiar to the area of student rights. Used in this fashion, it can
be a very helpful tool in facilitating the exercise of these rights
while providing valuable information to students and adults alike.
Any area of law which is relatively new and has been the
subject of a considerable amount of litigation frequently generates
a diversity of opinion on particular legal issues from one jurisdiction to another, reflecting the rapid and continuous change in caselaw. Student rights is no exception, and the authors readily
acknowledge this problem with The Rights of Students. Textual
statements as to what "the law is" are therefore often outdated
in a relatively short time. For example, the entire section on
student records has been superseded by new federal legislation
on the subject."1
There are also some flaws to be found in the book's attempt
authoritatively to declare on a national or state-by-state basis what
the law is on a particular position. An example of this difficulty
can be found in the section dealing with the regulation of the personal appearance of students in public schools. The handbook
lists twenty-five states in which the authors claim a student's hair
length cannot be regulated without a showing of disruption or a
relationship to a legitimate educational purpose. 2 The remaining
states, it is claimed, permit schools to regulate hair length without
restriction. California is listed among the second group, but in
actual fact, California law is unsettled.' 8
Despite the book's problems with over-simplification of
complex issues and over-generalization in some areas, it more than
11. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g
(1974).
12. A. LEVINE, E. CAREY, & D. DivoKY, THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS 47 (1973)

[hereinafter cited as THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS].
13. Compare, e.g., the fate of hair codes in the liberal northern half of the
state, Myers v. Arcata Union High Sch. Dist., 269 Cal. App. 2d 549, 75 Cal. Rptr.
68 (1969) (student wins), with that in the more conservative southern half of
the state, Akin v. Board of Educ., 262 Cal. App. 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1968)
(student loses) and the flat refusal of the federal court system even to consider
that the issue involves substantial constitutional rights, King v. Saddleback Junior
College, 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971).
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compensates for its weaknesses by its broad and comprehensive
coverage of student rights issues and its general sensitivity to
emerging questions in this area. In many ways, the unique
approach to the subject of students' rights used in the ACLU
handbook can better be understood if it is contrasted with a recent
publication of the California Attorney General's office entitled
Law in the Schools, 4 which is characteristic of most books dealing with students' rights. This work has been fairly widely
disseminated to school authorities by the Attorney General's
office. It is touted as the "official guide" for California teachers,
parents and students and takes a distinctly traditional view of "students' rights." For example, it contains only a rather short and
uninspiring treatment of the issue of first amendment rights of students, giving considerably more attention to the limits of free
speech than to an explanation of the right itself. In fact, this important subject area does not even warrant its own chapter in the
Attorney General's book, but is hidden in a section entitled "The
Limits of Discipline."' 5 Needless to say, the ACLU places a much
heavier emphasis on affirmative rights than on negative restraints. 16
Another example of the differing approaches and analyses
used by the ACLU and the Attorney General's office is the issue
of police authority to interrogate students on school grounds for
non-school related activities.' 7 Although there have been no reported cases directly on point, both books nevertheless attempt to
deal with the question and reach distinctly different conclusions.
Law in the Schools states flatly that "law enforcement officers
have the right to interview students who are suspects or witnesses
while those students are at school."'" That statement is supported
only by a footnote to an earlier opinion of the Attorney General
which reached the same conclusion on nothing more substantive
than the Attorney General's claim to possess such authority. In
contrast, The Rights of Students is more honest in its treatment
of the subject, pointing out simply that students have the right to
remain silent and that neither school officials nor anyone else can
make a student talk to the police, irrespective of any police
authority to question students on school grounds.' 9
The ACLU handbook also points out that several states have
adopted policies by which police are specifically denied the power
14.
15.
16.
17.

LAw IN THE SCHOOLS.

Id. at 69.

THE RIGHTs OF STUDENTS, supra note 12, at 21-46.
Compare THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS, supra note 12, at 81-83 with LAw
IN THE SCHOOLS, supra note 14, at 12-13.
18. LAW IN THE SCHOOLS, supra note 14, at 12.
19. THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS, supra note 12, at 81-83.
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to interrogate on the school grounds. For example, the text cites
a New York State Education Department provision which states
that "children are given over to the custody of the school authorities for one purpose only and that is education in all its phases,"
and therefore that "police authorities have no power to interview
children in the school building or to use school facilities in connection with police department work, and the [school] board has no
right to make children available for such purposes."2 0
In general, The Rights of Students provides a respectable
overview of the present status of student rights in our public
schools and some suggestions for the expansion of these rights.
As might be expected, the authors emphasize decisions which are
favorable to students while they de-emphasize those which have
restricted student rights. In some cases that tendency might mislead students into a belief that their rights are more secure and
extensive than they actually are. Nevertheless, the authors are
quite candid in distinguishing the possession of an abstract right
from the actual enforcement or protection of that right. They
state in the preface: "This guide offers no assurances that your
rights will be respected."'" That cautionary note is particularly
appropriate in the area of student rights; hopefully, students and
others relying upon The Rights of Students will give due consideration to this caveat.
In sum, The Rights of Students is an innovative and sorely
needed practical reference book which will prove highly useful to
students, their parents, teachers and school administrators.
Susanne Martinez*
20.
21.
*
lege of

Id. at 82.
Id. at 8.
B.A., 1967, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1970, Hastings ColLaw; staff attorney, Youth Law Center, San Francisco, California.

THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS. By David Rudovsky. An
American Civil Liberties Union Handbook. New York: Avon
Books. 1973. Pp. ix, 128. Softbound. $.95.
Intended as an introductory catalog and explanation of the
rights of prisoners, this ACLU handbook is designed primarily for
use by prisoners themselves in the hope of fostering a greater
awareness and more frequent exercise of their rights. Rather
than academically listing and explaining the few fundamental
rights which prisoners possess, author David Rudovsky also informs his reader how these rights are frequently infringed and
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even denied altogether as a result of the harsh realities of our
prison system.
The author advocates judicial intervention in prison affairs
to obtain an effective restoration and future protection of these
prisoner rights. Clearly, he sees the courts as a foil between two
hostile camps-prisoners and prison staff. In his discussion of the
prison environment, where guards and officials have the discretionary power to change the judicially imposed conditions of a
prisoner's confinement-and even the length of his prison term' Rudovsky concentrates on explaining the prisoner's rights to
due process and identifying recent trends toward more complete
adversarial hearings, assistance of counsel, and requirements for
statements of charges and provisions for review. In the main body
of this compact work, the author examines the status of the battle
for substantive prisoners rights. 2 Lastly, and with only a trifle of
self-consciousness, the author exposes the cruel hoax of a prisoner's
actual prospects for judicial intervention to protect his rights. Any
reader who has had experience with prison reform knows that very
few lawyers accept free prison cases, that few organizations litigate
on prisoners' behalf, that jail-house lawyers cannot adequately
litigate cases from their cells, and that the time it takes to carry a
civil rights action to completion can fatigue even the hardiest and
most dedicated attorney. Arrayed against the single prisoner (and
his volunteer attorney, if one can be secured) stand -the prison staff
and administrators, their witnesses, their resources and mobility,
their correctional officers' association, the state Attorney General's
office, and sometimes the court itself.
When confronted with these overwhelming odds against reform through judicial intervention, anyone who would encourage
prisoners to undertake the battle alone with the expectation of
quick success is simply being unrealistic. Rudovsky's emphasis
on remedies and procedures, particularly in Chapter X, confirms
the genuinely optimistic view which the author has of reform
through litigation. The facts, however, indicate that even the
most eloquent denunciations of actual prison practices by liberal
state and federal judges (many of whom are quoted in part in
the handbook) have been all but ignored in practice.'
1. D. RuDOVSKY, THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 21 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
RuDovsKY]. In California, a prisoner's term is fixed by a parole authority within

the limits prescribed by law; information placed in a prisoner's file by guards may
be relied upon by the parole authority as a basis for denying parole or refusing
to release prior to the expiration of the maximum term.
2. Some of the important rights guaranteed to prisoners include the right to
correspond with and petition the courts, to practice a preferred religion, to receive
medical treatment, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
3. In Jordon v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966), the court
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As an example, the courts have declared that prisoners have
the right to read any book which does not pose a threat to the
security of the institution. A noble gesture, but of minor significance when one considers the actual hurdles the prisoner must
vault to exercise this "right." First, if the book is not objectionable to prison authorities, the prisoner must persuade the prison
library to order the book he desires; then he must obtain permission to visit the prison library before he can read the book. This
is more difficult than it appears, for often the more politically
oriented prisoners find themselves in restricted units or isolation
cells where library privileges are denied. If, for any reason, the
library is unwilling to purchase the book, then the prisoner must
get the prison administration to agree that the particular book he
desires does not pose the prohibited threat to security. Next he
must obtain sufficient funds to purchase the book himself, locate
the publisher, place the order and wait. This procedure must be
repeated each time the prisoner wishes to acquire a new and controversial book, and a refusal at any step will frustrate his efforts.
If permission is denied at any stage of the process, the prisoner
must either abandon his efforts, or resort to the lengthy and often
ineffective litigation discussed above.4 The fact that the prisoner's right to read what he pleases, although protected in principle by the courts, has been so often denied in practice by prison
officials, illustrates that Rudovsky was overly optimistic in looking
to judicial intervention for the protection of prisoners' rights.
Despite the general ineffectiveness of judicial intervention
in prison administration, the courts have produced significant
changes in prison disciplinary methods through their development
of the concept of cruel and unusual punishment. Rudovsky devotes one of his chapters to cruel and unusual punishment and
its use as a ground for prohibiting perverse prison practices. What
evaded Rudovsky's detection, however, is the metamorphosis of
the entire prison system in many states from one in which prisoners are punished by the loss of their liberty for a specified term
under conditions which are more or less tolerable, to one in which
the length of the term served depends upon a change in an
individual's personality, outlook, philosophy and character as
measured solely by the prison authorities. Whereas prisoners in
the past were commonly subjected to physical punishments, or
enjoined the use of strip cells at Soledad Prison, recognizing that they endangered
the health of prisoners and threatened their sanity. The same cells are still in
use today, as are substantially identical ones at San Quentin and Folsom prisons,
with minor variations supposedly designed to insure that a reasonable modicum
of sanitation is maintained within the cells.
4. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
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confined under physically cruel and unusual conditions, in modem
prisons punishment is primarily psychological and is imposed
through isolation, segregation, and indeterminate sentencing. Nevertheless, the consequences of indeterminate sentencing in "security
housing" have not yet been recognized by the courts as constituting
"punishment," nor were these consequences included in Rudovsky's appraisal of the realities of prison life.
Rudovsky's text concisely summarizes the recent state of
"prison law" and, for this reason, the handbook is useful both to
lawyers and prisoners. He misleads the reader, however, when
he emphasizes that it is the prison guard, underpaid, undertrained
and drawn from society's lower ranks, who sabotages efforts to observe prisoners' rights within the prisons. In actual fact, most
prison oppression is created by the prison structure itself rather
than by individual guards.
By criticizing Rudovsky's acceptance of the present system
I do not seek to discourage efforts to eliminate prison abuses, but
instead to urge that such efforts be directed with more precision
and awareness of actual prison conditions. For example, a close
look at the functioning of the prison system reveals the euphemism
in the phrase "prisoners' rights." Prisoners do have the right to
limited access to the media, yet the prison retains the right to segregate certain prisoners "for their protection and the protection
of other prisoners and guards." In practical effect, this denies
some of them the right to be interviewed by the press. Prisoners
have won certain due process guarantees at prison disciplinary
hearings. Contrast these "guarantees" with the facts that the
members of the disciplinary committees are all prison staff, there
is no jury of the prisoner's peers, no independent review of the
committees' decisions, and no presumption of innocence for the
prisoner.
Aside from the disciplinary committee process, the prison
possesses a very effective alternative method of disciplining the
resisting, unsubmissive or rebellious prisoner-"classification."
Far more serious than the comparatively benign punishments the
5. In the recent decision In re Rodriguez (Crim. 18044) decided July 1,
1975, the California Supreme Court modified the state's indeterminate sentencing
law (Section 1168 of the Penal Code) by requiring the Adult Authority to fix
a "primary term" within the limits of the indeterminate sentence which is proportionate to the offense for which the prisoner was incarcerated. Earlier decisions
had upheld the constitutionality of the indeterminate sentence: Bennet v. People
of State of Calif., 406 F.2d 36 (9th Cir. 1969); Application of Gordon, 157 F.2d
'659 (9th Cir. 1946); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr.
217 (1972); Fleischer v. Adult Authority, 202 Cal. App. 2d 44, 20 Cal. Rptr.
603 (1962). None of the limits which have been imposed on the indeterminate
sentence has, as yet, been applied to the choice of housing within the prison itself.
RuoovsKY, supra note 1, at 85-87.
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disciplinary committee can decree, the classification committee
can declare prisoners "management problems" for whom special
security precautions, including segregation, exclusion from rehabilitation programs, denial of contact with other prisoners, and
visiting limitations are appropriate, all in the name of "institutional
security." Program participation and housing designation, both
determined by the classification committee, figure importantly in
the Adult Authority's parole considerations and may be the basis
on which parole is denied. Prisoners, for instance, are seldom
paroled directly from "security housing."
I do not mean to belittle Rudovsky's efforts, for he has made
a substantial contribution in a frustrating field, yet he does not
seem to understand how serious the problems are and whence
they spring. Prison hospitals, for instance, are criticized in the
book as being mismanaged and understaffed for the number of
inmates they must handle. Nevertheless, it is a fact that many
patients in prison hospitals are malingers. When, because of the
resultant overcrowding, over-worked hospital staffs become shorttempered, sloppy, or hostile, the problem is not simply the result
of inadequate medical facilities. It is caused instead by the institutional structure of prisons which encourages inmates to seek
relief from the stark conditions of their prison existence in the
comparative comfort of the hospital.
Similarly, humiliating personal "strip searches" or searches of
a prisoner's cell for contraband can be opposed on the principle
that they violate rights of privacy, confidentiality, or the fourth
amendment. But can such protestations stand in the face of the
prison's interest in the preservation of security, and in its need
to detect weapons or discover escape plans? Clearly not. We
prison reformers are naive if we do not realize that prisoners do
fashion and carry weapons and that they do make plans to escape.
Instead of denying the validity of the fundamental reasons underlying these prison procedures, we must relieve the pressures on inmates and guarantee the personal safety of prisoners so that they do
not have to arm themselves for protection to insure that they survive
their terms! One solution to the problem of prisoner safety is to
reduce the density of the prison population.
Rudovsky's manual is a start toward exposing the abuses of
the prison system, while providing the factual materials which prisoners and prison reform groups can use to work more effectively
for needed change, but it is only a start. Prisoners need access
to additional information which will apprise them of the means
by which to continue their struggle for recognition of their basic
civil rights. The Prison Law Collective's Jailhouse Lawyer's
Manual, the basic guide for prisoners' civil rights litigation, is an
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example of the format that could be emulated in books covering
other areas of concern to prisoners and prison reform groups.
Apart from Rudovsky's intended audience of prisoners and
prison reformers, however, this book serves another vital roleto sensitize the average citizen to the actual problems existing
within our current prison system. Because prisons reflect society
and its values, significant changes in the prisons must be preceded
by a revolution in societal values. True success in prisoner "rehabilitation" and the elimination of criminal recidivism presupposes the existence of a society whose overriding objective is
the satisfaction of the needs and fulfillment of the aspirations of
all of its members. It comes then as no surprise that our prisons
do not accomplish their correctional objectives when the social system itself is antagonistic to the interests of prisoners and channels
higher proportionate shares of minorities than whites to prison,
and more blacks to prison than to college; when the prisoner
knows that he faces divorce or poverty for his family as a result
of his imprisonment; and when "equal justice under law" is distorted so that the rich and powerful who run astray of the law are
given favored treatment, while the poor receive stiff terms. Perhaps Rudovsky's book will enable more people to understand the
importance of the basic human need to be assured of a job and
a place in society, and to realize that some criminal attempts to
fill this need are not the product of "sickness," but of lack of skills,
education or social opportunity. If so, his book will have served
an even greater purpose than that for which it was written.
Mark E. Merin*
* B.A., 1965, Cornell University; J.D., 1968, University of Chicago; LL.M.,
1970, New York University; now in the private practice of law in San Francisco;
counsel to the San Quentin Six in a federal civil rights action challenging the conditions of their confinement in the San Quentin Adjustment Center.

